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CONTINUANCE-ABSENT WITNESSES-MATERIALITY-CUMULATIVE
TESTIMONY-COSTS-DISCRETION OF COURT-DILIGENCE-

DEPOSITIONS-Posig vs. Zelish-No. 13972-Decided March
29, 1937-District Court of Routt County--.Hon. Charles E.
Herrick, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Zelish sued Posig for $980.00, claimed to be due him
from the latter for services rendered under a verbal contract of employment by the terms of which he was to be paid a salary of $75.00 per
month. Posig alleged'that the plaintiff was employed as a "flunky"
around a pool hall for which he was to receive room, board and laundry. Jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, and on the denial of an
application for a continuance, Posig seeks to have the judgment entered
on the verdict reviewed. Posig had subpoenaed Dr. Courtney a day
before trial, but the doctor was ill and in bed the day of the trial and
it was impossible to get his deposition. Posig's attorney presented an
affidavit in support of a motion for continuance, stating why the doctor
was not present, and what evidence he expected the doctor to give. The
continuance was not granted.
HELD: Whether or not an application for continuance on the
ground of absent witness is sufficient must be determined under the Code
provisions therefor, and it there is made to rest entirely upon a showing
of materiality, and that due diligence had been used to procure the
material evidence.
2. An interested witness' testimony to the same effect as that of
an absent disinterested witness will not render the latter's testimony
cumulative, because the latter would be the only disinterested witness
giving testimony to the same general effect.
3. The cost attendant upon a continuance, if any, could have
been directed to be paid by the applicant.
4. While the granting or denying of an application for continuance on account of an absent witness is very largely in the discretion of
the court, it should be regarded as error or abuse of such discretion to
deny such an application, if it fully complies with legal requirement,
and on its face shows the materiality of the absent evidence and no lack
of diligence in the procurement.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
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et
al. us. The Burch Warehouse and Transfer Company-No. 13895
-Decided March 29, 1937-District Court of Pueblo CountyHon. John H. Voorhees, Judge-Reversed.

FACTS:
Plaintiffs in error filed this action in the district court to
enjoin defendant in error from selling, under execution and levy, certain lands upon which plaintiff, Maude Howell, had made marginal
entry of homestead. The exact question presented is whether or not an
equitable levy,.acquired by the filing of a complaint and a lis pendens in
a suit in the nature of a creditor's bill is superior to a formal claim of
homestead made after the equitable levy. Plaintiffs in error are husband and wife and will be designated as such. The husband was
owner of land and on October 29, 1927, by warranty deed, conveyed
the land to his wife. This deed was not recorded until September 30,
1931. In the meantime, and between October, 1927, and September,
1931, the husband incurred indebtedness which became the basis of
two judgments rendered against him January 26, 1932, one in favor
of, and the other assigned to, Burch, one of the defendants in error in
this case. February 2, 1932, Burch filed transcripts of these judgments
with the clerk and recorder of Pueblo county, where the land was situated. On February 18, 1932, he instituted an action in the district
court in the nature of a creditor's bill, seeking to set aside the deed from
Howell to his wife as a fraud upon creditors, and to subject the land
to the lien of the judgments. February 19, 1932, he filed notice of lis
pendens. February 24, 1932, the wife caused a homestead entry to be
entered on the margin of the record of her title under the provisions of
C. L., Sec. 5925, on September 27, 1934, the court set aside the deed
from Howell to his wife as a fraud on creditors. Levy was made on
December 6, 1934, and notice given that sale would be had January 3,
1935. January 4, 1935, the husband and wife, as plaintiff, filed the
present action for injunction.
HELD:
1. That until lands are subjected to a specific lien they
may be the basis of a claim of homestead exemption by the making of
the required marginal entry on the record of title.
2. The cases wherein lis pendens is discussed as affecting the matter of priority, as a lien, are those in which a purchaser, or one occupying a like status, is involved during the litigation. As between immediate parties a lis pendens is without office.
3. Where both husband and wife occupy the land, either one
may, at any time during their occupancy of the land, assert a homestead
right, and the fact, if it be a fact, that it was done for the purpose of
protecting that right against known creditors of the other, does not
vitiate the homestead right.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Justice Bouck concurs.
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ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS-PRESUMPTION-JUSTIFICATIONDAMAGES-INFERENCES-Squire vs. Hill-No. 14128-Decided

March 29, 1937-District Court of Fremont County-Hon.
James L. Cooper, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Defendant in error, plaintiff below, January 2, 1937,
obtained a judgment for $3,000.00 against the plaintiff in error, defendant, in a complaint alleging alienation of affections. To review
this judgment, error is assigned. Defendant contends the evidence
clearly establishes that plaintiff's wife had no affection for her husband
long prior to January, 1930, therefore there could have been no
alienation thereof by defendant.
HELD:
1. There is a presumption that a husband living and
cohabiting with his wife has her affection.
2. A husband's ill treatment of his wife is no justification for
another's conduct which contributes to a total or even further loss of her
affection for him.
3. Circumstances from which the inference of carnal intercourse
could be drawn may be considered in aggravation of damages for
alienation of affections.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.

INSURANCE-PoISON-ACCIDENTAL DEATH-INTERPRETATION OF
WORDS-DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-The Equitable Life As-

surance Society of the United States vs. Hemenover, et a.-No.
13772-Decided March 29, 1937-District Court of Larimer
County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The deceased carried a $5,000 life policy in the company.
A double indemnity clause increased the sum to $10,000 in case of accidental death. Deceased died December 31, 1932; the company admitted
liability for $5,000 only. Defendants in error brought this suit for a
declaratory judgment establishing the applicability of the double indemnity clause on the ground of death by accident. The death was admittedly due to an overdose of luminal, taken for "nerves," or sleeplessness,
and admittedly accidental. Policy provided that: "Death from accident
means death resulting solely from bodily injuries directly, exclusively
and independently of all other causes by external, violent and purely
accidental means, * * * but does not include death resulting from or
caused directly or indirectly by the taking of any poison."
HELD: 1. The court does not draw the fine distinction between
"accidental death" and "death from accidental means"; it gives this language its ordinary and popular meaning, and any ambiguities and uncertainties in insurance policies using this language are to be resolved
against the company.
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2. If there is a popular interpretation, a commonly accepted
meaning, of the word "poison," such is the interpretation which the
court will give it.

3. The popular interpretation of "poison" is that it is a substance which, in small doses, will destroy life. Therefore, the "poison"
exception in the policy should not be extended to luminal as it was taken
in this case.
4. Declaratory judgments may be sought by any person interested under a written contract to have determined any question of construction arising under the contract, if an actual controversy exists.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
MORTGAGE-REDEMPTION-TAXES DURING REDEMPTION PERIODRENTS IN HANDS OF RECEIVER-TRUSTEE'S DEED-Walker vs.
Fleming-No. 13952-Decided April 26, 1937-District Court
of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The only question involved in this case is whether one
who has received a trustee's deed is entitled to have the money, which the
receiver collects as rent off the property during the period of redemption,
applied on the payment of taxes during the period of redemption.
HELD:
1. A judgment creditor redeeming the property and
having a trustee's deed issued to him stands in no different position than
the purchaser at a foreclosure sale, and if he is called upon to pay taxes
during the period of redemption, he is entitled to be reimbursed to the
extent that the money in the hands of the receiver will permit, and particularly would that be true where the receiver was ordered to pay the
taxes.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Hilliard concur.
HOME RULECITY CHARTERPUBLIC
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWUTILITIES COMMISSION - FIXING OF RATES - CONTRACTS CONFISCATORY RATES-RELIEF THEREFROM--Spears vs. The
Public Utilities Commission of Colorado et at.-No. 1384 1-Decided April 26, 1937-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. George F.
Dunklee, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, brought this action
against the commission and the Public Service Company of Colorado.
The parties hereafter will be designated as the plaintiff, the commission,
and the utility. Plaintiff, a citizen of Denver, and patron of the utility,
sought to maintain an action before the commission, in accordance with
statute, to have the rates of the utility decreased on the ground that they
were excessive and unreasonably high. Upon the filing of a motion by
the utility to dismiss, the commission dismissed on the ground that under
Article XX of the Colorado Constitution and the Denver City Charter
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the power to fix and regulate rates of a public utility rests entirely with
the city. The District Court subsequently sustained the action of the
commission.
HELD: 1. Cities operating under a Home Rule Charter can fix
public utility rates by contract.
2. "If the body having jurisdiction to fix rates by compulsion
fixes a rate that is unreasonable or confiscatory, nothing is more definitely settled than that the courts, when applied to under such circumstances, will afford relief." The commission, in this case, was right in
refusing to take jurisdiction in the premises.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.
COMPLAINT-PLEADING-GENERAL DEMURRER-AGENCY--SCOPE
OF EMPLOYMENT-TORTS-DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTS-JUDICIAL ADMISSION-QUESTIONS OF FACT-Marron vs. Helmecke

-No. 14028-Decided April 26, 1937-DistrictCourt of Montrose County-Hon. Straud M. Logan, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action by plaintiff in error, plaintiff below, to recover
damages for injuries to person and property against defendant in error,
defendant below, caused by the alleged unlawful and negligent operation
of an automobile owned by defendant in error. The court below sustained a general demurrer to plaintiff's second amended complaint and
the Supreme Court is now asked to pass upon the sufficiency to the complaint. Defendant permitted Moore, the employee of defendant, to take
defendant's automobile to the Uncompahgre Valley. The cities of
Montrose and Delta are in the said valley. Moore drove to Montrose,
and there did permit one Hauser to have the car to drive to Delta. Hauser
while driving towards Delta -lost control of the car and collided with
defendant's automobile. Plaintiff, in his complaint, stated the facts but
made an admission to the effect "that.the contemplated trip from Montrose to Delta, Colorado, was not on any business of the defendant."
HELD: 1. A principal is liable to third persons for torts committed by his agent in pursuance of, or as a natural result of, express
orders given by the principal, or which he has expressly authorized and
specially directed his agent to commit.
2. The lender of a machine, not inherently dangerous in itself,
should not be held liable to third persons for the negligent acts of the
borrower who is using it at a time in his own business or for his own
pleasure.
3. An admission is a recognition of fact or truth. A judicial admission is a voluntary acknowledgment made by a party of a material
fact appearing of record in the proceedings of a court.
4. If the agent steps aside from the principal's business, for however short a time, to do acts not connected with such business, the rela-
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tion of agency to the agent is for that time suspended, and the agent is
not acting within the scope of his employment.
5. Ordinarily the question of agency and the extent of the agent's
authority is one for the jury, but the plaintiff's admission made it proper
for determination by the court.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Hilliard concur.
CRIMINAL LAW-INSURANCE-PUBLIC POLICY-EVIDENCE-RECORD OF CONVICTION-PLEA IN BAR-BURDEN OF PROOF-The
North River Insurance Company of New York vs. MilitelloNo. 13849-Decided April 26, 1937-DistrictCourt of Las Animas County-Hon. John I. Palmer, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Defendant in error, as owner, procured a policy of fire
insurance from plaintiff in error on an apartment house in Trinidad,
Colorado. On July 13, 1932, while the policy was in full force and
effect, the building was destroyed by an explosion and fire. On the
following day, July 14, 1932, an information, charging him with burning the property with intent to injure and defraud the insurer, was filed
in the District Court. A jury returned a verdict of guilty on May 19,
1933. On review to the Supreme Court, the conviction was upheld
October 29, 1934. On September 17, 1932, before trial of the criminal
charge, the present action was instituted in which defendant in error sued
the plaintiff in error for recovery on the policy. Upon the trial to a
jury, the record of the conviction in the criminal case, then pending on
review, was admitted in evidence under an instruction to the jury that it
was offered and admitted only for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of plaintiff. The jury's verdict, returned on September 22, 1934,
was for defendant in error, in the full amount of the policy. Judgment
on the verdict was entered October 30, 1934. January 8, 1935, the
insurance company filed a motion in arrest of, and to vacate the judgment on the grounds that the judgment of conviction had been affirmed
by the Supreme Court and became final on and after November 19,
1934, when petition for rehearing was denied; further that the judgment
as affirmed was a final and irrevocable determination of the fact of the
destruction of the property by plaintiff in fraud of the insurer which
precluded recovery against the insurance company and that the judgment
rendered against it thereby became an illegal judgment. These motions
were overruled and the insurance company assigns error.
HELD: 1. When the fact of plaintiff's guilt of having caused
the destruction of the building with intent to defraud the insurer was
established beyond a reasonable doubt and was before the trial court,
sound public policy required vacation of the judgment, and the entering
of order for a new trial, and the denial of the motion was error.
2. The conviction as an adjudicated fact has application only to
the parties thereto; that is, the people and the defendant-now plaintiff
-and not to, or as between the parties hereto. Otherwise there would
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be a mutuality of estoppel, and the matter adjudicated would be a sound
basis for a plea in bar.
3. The record of conviction in a criminal case when admitted into
evidence in a civil action is prima facie evidence of the facts charged; it is
such presumptive proof as to shift the burden to the convicted to establish his innocence thereof.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
STATUTES-CITIES-PLEDGING OF SECURITY-DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS-BONDS---SET OFF-BANKS-ESCRow-Tighe et al. vs.

Cleaves et al.-No. 13990-Decided April 26, 1937-District
Court of Denver-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action was by Cleaves, City Treasurer of the city of
Aurora, for a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of a pledge
agreement executed by The First National Bank of Aurora by which the
bank pledged securities or assets in escrow to secure the repayment of
deposited public funds. At the time of liquidation of the bank, Cleaves
demanded the assets so pledged from the escrow holder, but was refused
delivery because the receiver of the bank had made claim therefor. Receiver contends that the bank is entitled to set off against debts owing it
by the city, i. e., bonds of the city owned by the bank. This action
rests upon the construction of Sec. 7, Chapter 65, S. L. 1927, that:
"No bank shall pledge or hypothecate any of its securities except as
collateral for direct bills payable and/or for the protection of public
funds, or moneys in said bank, in accordance with statutes now or hereafter enacted." Under the Federal Act, 12 USCA, Chapter 2, Section
90, if there is a statute of the State of Colorado, where the bank is located, authorizing the pledging of its assets to secure the repayment of
deposited public funds, then the bank, being a national bank, had the
right to pledge the securities as was done in this case.
HELD: 1. The meaning and construction of the statute in question gives clear authority for the pledging by the bank of its assets to
secure the protection of public funds deposited with it.
2. Treasurer in his official capacity was the proper person to bring
this action.
3.
As to the set-off claim of the receiver, that matter is one which
concerns the bank and city only, and is to be settled at a time when the
bonds have matured; in no way could a cause of action for payment of
such obligations be maintained against the Treasurer.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
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ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE - MERRY-GO-ROUNDSINTERVENING CAUSE-TORTS-DANGEROUS CHARACTER OF INSTRU-

MENT-EVIDENCE---Sirmkins et al. us. Dowis-No. 13933Decided April 26, 1937-DistrictCourt of Logan County-Hon.
Arlington Taylor, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Action instituted by Simkins, a minor, by his mother and
next friend against defendant in error for recovery of damages for injuries sustained by plaintiff, eight years old, while playing with other children on defendant's merry-go-round, which was but partially installed,
and which was left unguarded and unprotected. Two boys, about fourteen years of age, threw a rope over one of the projecting arms of the
superstructure and began to revolve the merry-go-round, thereby causing
the cog wheels to turn and crush the plaintiff's foot. Lower court gave
directed verdict in favor of defendant in error.
HELD:
1.
"If an owner sees fit to keep on his premises something that is an attraction and allurement to the natural instincts of
childhood, the law imposes upon him the corresponding duty to take
reasonable precautions to prevent the intrusion of children, or to protect
from personal injury such as may be attracted thereby."
A merry-goround has inherent qualities that make it attractive to children.
2.
The fact that serious injuries were sustained by plaintiff in
error shows the dangerous character of the attractive instrumentality.
3.
An intervening cause would not defeat the plaintiff's right of
recovery. Nor does the fact that the boys who placed the machine in
operation were of such an age that they should have anticipated the
result of their action and thereby be guilty of negligence themselves, alter
the situation.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
EVIDENCE-COLLISION-BAILMENT-PREJUDICIAL ERROR-INSURANCE-CONVERSATIONS-MAPS AND DIAGRAMS-Irvin et al. vs.
Blair-No. 13868-Decided April 26, 1937-District Court of
Douglas County-Hon. Arthur Cornforth, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: This case arose out of an automobile collision. Judgment
was entered in the District Court on a $1,000 jury verdict for damages
in favor of the injured plaintiff, Grace Blair, and against the defendants,
C. C. Irvin, Carl Irvin, and Carl G. Spangler. The defendants claim
reversible error. A coach and a truck collided. Plaintiff was in the
coach, which was owned and being driven by her father. Carl Irvin
and Spangler were the only persons riding on the truck, the property of
the absent defendant, C. C. Irvin. Defendants allege that the absent
defendant was merely a bailor, and that the other defendants were bailees
on business of their own. Defendants contend that the court ought not
to have excluded certain evidence offered by C. C. Irvin for the purpose
of explaining and contradicting what is claimed to be an admission of
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Spangler's relation to him as employee and agent for and during the particular trip. The excluded testimony would have tended to establish
that Irvin had no knowledge of the alleged admission, and that his attorney had prepared, sworn to, and filed the complaint without submitting
it to Irvin in the case of Irvin against plaintiff's father to recover damages
for the injury inflicted upon his truck.
HELD: 1. It was clearly not a question whether the plaintiff, as
client in an entirely different case to which the plaintiff was not a party,
was bound by what his attorney did or said; the question was whether
or not certain specific knowledge had come to the mind of one of the
defendants. Not to admit the evidence offered was prejudicial error,
and since all defendants were tried as a whole, complete justice calls for
a reversal as to all.
2. The allowance over objection of a misstatement of the law by
counsel in his argument to the jury constitutes prejudicial error and is
ground for reversal.
3.
Conversations dealing with automobile insurance are inadmissible and prejudicial.
4. Diagrams and maps illustrating the scene of a transaction, and
the relative location of the objects, if proved to be correct, are admissible
in evidence.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
RIGHTS OF WAY-EASEMENTS-INJ UNCTION -EMERGENCY - LEGAL RIGHTS-CROSS COMPLAINT-Modrell et al. us. CrewsNo. 13919-Decided April 26, 1937-District Court of Yuma
County-Hon. Arlington Taylor, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The action was an injunction suit brought by Crews as
plaintiff to restrain the defendant from interfering with an alleged right
of way. \ The existence of the right of way over defendant's land as a
necessary means of access to the plaintiff's reservoir for the purpose of
repairing the latter and using the waters therein impounded for irrigation
purposes is clearly proved, and is also admitted by the defendants. On
the other hand, the plaintiff's claim of an easement and right of way
beyond the purely irrigational purposes, namely, his claim for purposes
of fishing and hunting, and for cutting and removing ice from the reservoir, is sharply contested.
HELD:
1. In the absence of some emergency which does not
appear from the present record, an injunction suit cannot legitimately
be used to determine title to property or property rights.
2. The dispute about rights of hunting and fishing, and of cutting and harvesting ice, does not enter here because of any present interference therewith. The matter must await disposition in some proper
adjudication wherein legal rights can be established.
3. A cross complaint, in an action for alleged illegal interference
with a right of way, which alleges omissions by the other party which
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resulted in damages has nothing to do with the action and should be
stricken out.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
WILLS -TESTAMENTARY
TRUSTEES -BENEFICIARIES
-JURISDICTION OF THE COUNTY COURT-BOND---TESTATOR'S INTENTThe Kingdom of Yugo-Slatia vs. Jovanovich et al.-No. 13797Decided April 26, 1937-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. George
A. Luxford, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Chucovich left a will wherein the defendants in error
were named as testamentary trustees of a fund which was to be used for
designated charitable purposes in Yugo-Slavia; also that James A. Marsh
was to act as attorney for the executors, and was to receive $10,000 for
his services. The plaintiff in error objected to the appointment of defendants in error as trustees and also to the allowance of an attorney's
fee of $25,000 to Mr. Marsh.
HELD:
1. Where one intends that the administration of his
estate shall continue "after payment in full of all debts and legacies"
his estate is not to be considered settled until the trust or trusts created by
his will have been fully executed and the jurisdiction of the County
Court must be sought, for only it has original jurisdiction under the
Constitution.
2.
Where the will does not state that executors and/or trustees
shall discharge their duties without bond it is the duty of the court to
require the same.
3.
Practical difficulties cannot be permitted to thwart the testatot's expressed desires. The court is bound by the expressed intention
of the testator.
4. A beneficiary under a will (Mr. Marsh is considered as such
under paragraph 18 of the will) may elect whether he will take a
bequest, and is allowed a reasonable time for acceptance or rejection.
Mr. Marsh had rejected in writing the $10,000 and had gone to work
for them with the understanding that he was to get just compensation,
and the lower court's finding that $25,000 was a reasonable fee cannot
be disturbed by the Supreme Court.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY
-DISCRETION
OF THE COMMISSION-Rio Grande Motor Way
et al. vs. DeMerschman et al.-No. 14122-Decided April 26,
1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. Joseph J. Walsh, Judge
-Affirmed.
FACTS: Workmen's compensation case and the sole question is
whether the claimant is totally and permanently disabled.
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HELD: 1. An injured workman is not to be denied a finding of
total and permanent disability because not the victim "of helpless paralysis reducing bodily functions to the minimum essential for the maintenance of a mere spark of life." And though "able to obtain occasional
employment under rare conditions and at small remuneration" (the
equivalent of precarious employment at half salary through family influence, as a matter of charity, or the recognition of a moral responsibility,
or as a mere gratuity) one may still "be totally disabled for all practical
purposes of competing for remunerative employment in any general field
of human endeavor."
2. Whether degree of disability be determined from general impairment, or impairment of capacity to perform specific work, or both,
depends upon the facts of each case, and therefore the commission is
vested with the "widest possible discretion."
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Bakke concur.
Quo-Estep
et al vs. Croll-No. 13982-Decided May 3, 1937-District

CONTRACTS-DEEDS, CHANGES IN-EQUITY-STATUS

Court of Pueblo County-Hon. John H. Voorhees, JudgeAffirmed.
FACTS: Parties are here designated as they appeared in the trial
court. Suit was brought to enjoin foreclosure of a deed of trust to a
ranch on the ground of a contract to the contrary. The defense was that
the contract was void for fraud. Judgment having been rendered in
favor of defendant, plaintiffs prosecute a writ to review that judgment.
Croll owned the ranch and sold it to Rusler, taking the deed in question
for $4,765 unpaid purchase price. Rusler sold to the Ferns, subject to
the encumbrance. The Ferns reconveyed to Croll, subject to same.
Croll then conveyed to plaintiffs, still subject to the encumbrance. This
last was a portion of a deal involving other property. Plaintiffs contracted to convey to Croll 1,802 acres of deeded land, certain relinquishments, mining claims, and personal property and to pay taxes. It was
further stipulated that in case of trouble concerning back payments on a
Government loan, the contract should be held void. Plaintiff's deed to
defendant fell short by 800 acres. They did not own, and failed to
deliver, most of the personal property. They did not pay taxes, and the
Government started suit to foreclose for non-payment of its loan. They
held a portion of the real estate deeded to defendant under transfer from
one Glaze, who brought suit to set it aside. The deed they furnished to
the Glaze property had originally been executed by Glaze to George W.
Estep, who caused his own name to be erased and the name of defendant
written in, without the knowledge or consent of either.
HELD: 1. The unauthorized changing of the name of the grantee
in a deed will render it void.
2. When necessary equity will return parties to status quo.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Knous and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
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WATER RIGHTS-BY-LAWS OF A CORPORATION-NOTICE OF POLICY
-The Costilla Ditch Company us. The Excelsior Ditch Company

et al.-No. 13901-Decided May 3, 1937-DistrictCourt of Alamosa County-Hon. John I. Palmer, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: This is a controversy between two mutual ditch companies involving the question whether the one which had acquired stock
in the other can use the water represented by that stock on lands other
than those served by the ditch of the latter. The defendants in error
refused to deliver the water represented by the plaintiffs in error's stock,
in consequence whereof the action in mandamus under review was begun,
and in answer to an alternative writ the defendants in error pleaded a
by-law reading as follows: "No transfer of water from one tract of
land to another tract of land shall be permitted except by and upon the
approval of the Board of Directors."
Plaintiffs in error had no knowledge of this when purchasing the stock.
HELD:
1. A by-law of a corporation, which amounts to a belated announcement of its "policy," immediately put into effect as against
a newly acquiring stockholder purchasing in the faith of the non-existence of any such policy, is arbitraryland unreasonable, and cannot be
asserted to the detriment of the new stockholder. The trial court is
directed to grant its peremptory writ of mandamus.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.

INSURANCE-MUTUAL COMPANIES-CHANGES IN APPLICATION OF
INSURANCE-INSURANCE CODE, VIOLATION THEREOF-ULTRA
VIRES ACTS-United States Mutual Insurance Company of Denver, Colorado us. Taylor-No. 14011-Decided May 3,.1937-District Court of Moffat County-Hon. Charles C. Herrick,
Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: A judgment was recovered on an accident policy and is
now up for review. In June, 1935, the insurance company issued to
Taylor a policy providing, among other things, for the payment of
$1,000 to his beneficiary in monthly installments of $100 if death
should occur by accident. In September, 1935, Taylor met an accidental death. The insurance application requested insurance in the
principal sum of $1,500 and stated the first premium to be $50 for
twelve months, which sum Taylor paid. It is insisted that the insurance
liability was in the sum of $500, not $1,500 asked for or the $1,000
mentioned in the policy. Without the knowledge of the insured or his
beneficiary, the company's office records uniformly dealt with Taylor's
insurance as for $500. The amount in the application was changed in
pencil to $500 without the advice or knowledge of Taylor. After the
$1,000 policy had been delivered to Taylor, he was informed that the
policy had been reduced because of his occupation. The main contention
in favor of reversal is that under statute the company, being a Mutual
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Insurance Company, had no authority, in June, 1935, to issue any one
policy for a greater principal sum than 20% of the company's admitted

assets, which then stood at $3,155.93.
HELD: 1. A violation of the insurance code may incur penalties
for an offending company and its officers, but, in the absence of a clear
statutory requirement, it cannot be allowed to destroy contractual obligations because technically the company's act is ultra vires.
2.
In insurance contracts the liability becomes fixed once and for
all; the installments must stand or fall together.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
CONTRACTS-EVIDENCE-PLEADING--ESTOPPEL-Eaton vs. Swedlund-No. 13950-Decided May 3, 1937-District Court of
Logan County-Hon. Arlington Taylor, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The parties are here in reverse order of their appearance
in the District Court and will be designated as plaintiff and defendant.
Judgment was in favor of the plaintiff in the trial court. Hartman
owned property on which plaintiff, Swedlund, held a deed of trust securing payment of a note. Hartman conveyed the property, subject to
plaintiff's trust deed, to Anderson, a director of the bank, in trust for
himself and the other directors. Plaintiff agreed with the bank to extend
the note for three years. There being a default under this contract, the
plaintiff made the following proposition to the bank: "Interest and
taxes have so accumulated in connection with my loan, originally made
to L. C. Hartman, that I am forced to demand some sort of settlement.,
To clean the matter up I am willing to accept deed to the premises involved, subject only to my mortgage and taxes, in full settlement,
thereby releasing you from any further liability in this matter. This
offer is not to be good indefinitely, but for a period not to exceed ten
days. As a further consideration for your release, the existing lease to
the Haxtun Co-operative Oil Company is to be assigned to me."
On June 26th the president of the bank wrote King, attorney for
plaintiff, accepting the proposition and pointing out a "complication" in
complying with the offer. The directors had sold the property on contract, with a deed in escrow, to McCullock and his son, Sam. Sam had
died intestate, leaving a widow and minor son as heirs. The widow was
willing to turn the property back. On July 6th the president wrote a
letter enclosing a deed from Anderson to plaintiff, with instructions that
it be held until a release of the contract with the McCullocks could be
procured. On September 25th, King wrote the president of the bank,
advising him the plaintiff withdrew her offer because it had not been
complied with within the ten-day period. On November 9th, the deed
from Anderson was again sent to plaintiff with fifty cents for the required revenue, together with an 4ssignment of the lease, an insurance
policy that expired on December 5th following, and an order of the
County Court for the release of the McCullocks of the property. King
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retained the above and they were retained by him and were in his possession at the time of the trial.
In April, plaintiff instituted action on the note and contract assuming its payment. Defendant contends that plaintiff was estopped from
relying on non-compliance with her offer by the action of King, her
attorney, in retaining the papers after receiving them on November 8th
without notifying the directors that he did not deem them a compliance
with the terms of the offer.
HELD: 1. Where one, with the facts constituting an estoppel
known to him when he filed his answer, chose to rely solely on performance, and did not plead estoppel as a defense, he cannot later successfully
claim or receive the benefit of it.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck, Mr. Justice
Knous and Mr. Justice Holland dissent.

SON'S DUTY TO SUPPORT AGED PARENT-COMMON LAW-STATUTES
-The Board of County Commissioners of the County of Phillips
vs. Kohrell-No. 13985-Decided May 3, 1937-District Court
of Phillips County-Hon. Arlington Taylor, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action brought by plaintiff in error against the defendant
in error, defendant below, for an alleged failure or refusal to support his
aged father under the provisions of the statute. The jury found for the
defendant and the case is brought up for review. The father of the defendant, a seventy-six year old man, had lived with the defendant and
his family for fifteen years, receiving the best of care. In the early part
of 1932 he apparently became dissatisfied and voluntarily left and went
to another city.
Plaintiff's contention is that the defendant's willingness to support
and care for his father ir his (defendant's) home, as expressed by a letter
to the plaintiff, is not a compliance with the statute and that the plaintiff
had the right, regardless of the offer of the defendant, to place the old
man in a private home and charge the defendant for his maintenance and
care.
HELD:
1. A child was not bound under the common law to
support his parent. The obligation is statutory and the liability may
not be extended beyond the provisions of the statute, and can be enforced
only in the manner and under the circumstances set out.
2.
The jury, after being properly instructed, finding that the defendant h-d not failed or refused to support his father within the meaning of the statute, will not be overruled on review.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
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MONEY LENDERS' ACT-DEMURRER-STATUTES-Dowd

et al.

vs.

The Labor Finance Corporation-No. 13939-Decided May 3,
1937-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge
-Judgment modified and cause remanded.
FACTS: The defendant in error, plaintiff below, recovered judgment against the plaintiffs in error, defendants below, in the sum of
$147.32 on a promissory note. The parties will be designated herein
as they were in the trial court.
Defendant borrowed $171.65, but actually received only $150.00
and had paid $51.10 on it when suit was started. Plaintiff admits
charging $21.65 for making the loan. To the complaint four defenses
were urged. First: Denial of further indebtedness; second: violation
of the 1913 Money Lenders' Act; third: violation of Chapter 93, Session Laws 1917; fourth: unconscionable and usurious interest. Demurrers were interposed to the second, third and fourth defenses, which
demurrers were sustained, defendants electing to stand on their defenses
as pleaded, and-judiment was entered on the issue as determined by the
complaint and the first defense.
HELD: 1. The facts and issues in this case are controlled by the
case of Waddell vs. Traylor, 99 Colo. 576, and in accordance with that
opinion it becomes necessary for us to modify the judgment in this case
and remand the same with instructions to overrule the demurrer as to
the second defense, and allow recovery on the note in accordance with
the provisions of Chapter 108, Session Laws 1913.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Hilliard concur.
STATE CONTRACTS-LOWEST RESPONSIBLE BIDDER, WHAT CONSTITUTES-UNION AND NON-UNION LABOR-Pallas vs. Johnson et

al.-No. 13999-Decided May 3, 1937-District Court of El
Paso County-Hon. John M. Meikle, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: In November, 1935, the State Purchasing Agent and Executive. Council advertised for plumbing and heating work at the Colorado State Hospital at Pueblo, where there was an immediate need for
such work. Pueblo is a well organized union labor town. Plaintiff in
error, a taxpayer, brought this suit to enjoin the defendants in error from
carrying out the contract entered into because it was not let to the lowest
responsible bidder as provided by statute. The statute in effect is as
follows: "All orders awarded on Contracts made by the State Purchasing Agent shall be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder, taking into
consideration the location of the institution or agency."
The contract was let to a contractor employing union labor, while
the lowest bidder on the particular contract here involved maintained
"open shop" and employed non-union labor. There was a stressing
need for the early completion of the work and it was determined that if
non-union labor was used difficulties and delays would arise.
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A determination of responsibility must be made by

the parties charged with the duty of letting such contracts. It always
includes matters of judgment and skill, and the ability to promptly and
satisfactorily carry on and complete the contract with freedom from
interference. If such interference is apparent or probable, due to particular conditions surrounding the bidder and bid under consideration, then
a finding or determination that the bidder is not, for that reason, a responsible bidder, is justified.
2. The statute calls for the lowest responsible bidder, and therefore the bidder must be responsible, taking into consideration the location
of the institution and the then prevailing circumstances.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
INSURANCE -

NEW

TRIAL -

APPELLATE REVIEW -

ACCIDENTAL

DEATH, SANE OR INSANE-SUICIDE-BURDEN OF PROOF-Cavaleri vs. North American Accident Insurance Company - No.
14056- Decided May 3, 1937-County Court of Denver-Hon.
J. Edgar Chenoweth, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The insurance company issued its accident policy to Joe
Cavaleri, whose wife, Nettie, plaintiff below, was named beneficiary.
The policy provided payment of a principal sum in case the insured
While the
should die "through external, violent and accidental means."
policy was in full force and effect the insured committed suicide by
shooting himself, dying instantly. Plaintiff brought suit to recover on
the policy and obtained -judgment. Defendant assigned error and the
Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that "where a person
commits suicide while insane, the death is accidental; where he commits
suicide while sane, the death is not accidental." "As plaintiff wholly failed
to prove accidental death, she failed to show a right of recovery on the
This question of sanity had not arisen in the trial
accident policy."
court. The cause was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings according to law. Thereafter plaintiff appeared in the lower court
and moved that the case be set for re-trial to a jury. Defendant objected
and argued that upon the reversal, the case was remanded for dismissal
only, and moved that judgment be entered for the defendant, which was
sustained by the court; to this ruling and judgment of dismissal, plaintiff
assigns error.
1. "A new trial will be directed where a reversal is orHELD:
dered on grounds not called to the attention of the trial court, and for
defects which the opposing party was given no opportunity to remedy,
where a material issue was ignored in the lower court or was not passed
upon by the jury, * * * or where a point was not contested in the trial
court, because of confidence apparently reposed in an erroneous expression by the appellate court in another case.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
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CONTEMPT-POLLUTION OF WATER- INJUNCTION -SUCCESSORS
IN TITLE-FORECLOSURE SALE-United Gilpin Corporation et
al. vs. Wilmore et al.-No. 14000-Decided May 3, 1937-District Court of Jefferson County-Hon. S. W. Johnson, JudgeAffirmed.
FACTS: On April 12, 1935, the District Court issued a permanent
injunction against the pollution of the water of Clear Creek and its
tributaries by the Chain O'Mines, its agents, employees, representatives,
successors and assigns. Plaintiffs in error acquired the property from
purchasers at a sheriff's sale of the property. Defendants in error brought
contempt proceedings against plaintiffs in error. The plaintiffs in error,
by their answer, seek to avoid the consequences of their act, the dumping
of tailings in the creek, by pleading an attempt to prevent the disposition
of the mill tailings into the creek, and by also denying that the injunction was in force and effect as to them.
HELD: 1. The intent of the injunctive order was to enjoin the
doing of a thing, more directly than the restraint of that thing being
done by any particular party or parties.
An injunction may be a restriction or restraint running with
2.
future operations of the property involved.
3.
A foreclosure sale and transfer of property will not revoke or
annul the restraining order of a court.
4.
All members of the public are bound to observe the restrictions
of an injunction order known to be in existence, and issued by a court
within its jurisdiction.
5.
Any person, though a stranger to the proceedings, who, with
knowledge of the existence of an injunctive writ and its terms, violates
the order or assists others in so doing, is by such interference defying the
administration of justice and is subject to the resulting perils and penalties.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.

ESTATES

-INTESTACY

-DETERMINATION

OF HEIRSHIP-COMMON

LAW MARRIAGE-JUVENILE COURT-STATUS OF ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD--RES ADJUDICATA-GUARDIAN AD LITEM-In re Estate
of Samuel H. Morrow. Morrow vs. Morrow-No. 13860-Decided May 3, 1937-DistrictCourt of Adams County-Hon. J.
C. Starkweather,Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Samuel H. Morrow died intestate in June, 1931. Petitions for determination of heirship were filed in the County Court,
whereby the following classes or individuals asserted they were heirs at
law of the decedent, to-wit: The first group comprised the four sisters,
a brother and a half-brother. The second claimant was the plaintiff in
error in this proceeding, who claimed to be the daughter of the decedent
born in lawful wedlock. The third claimant, Winifred Imogene Mor-
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row, the mother of the plaintiff in error, claimed to be the widow of the
deceased. The fourth claimant was Ruth Margaret Morrow, one of the
defendants in error here, who claimed to be issue of the marriage of the
deceased and Jessie Younker Morrow, also deceased. Trial was had in
the County Court, as a result of which the first group were adjudged
to be his only heirs at law. On appeal to the District Court, Ruth
Margaret Morrow, one of-the defendants in error, was decreed to be the
sole and only heir of said decedent. Winifred Imogene Morrow filed a
relinquishment of any interest in the estate she might have to her own
daughter, Marjorie Jean, plaintiff in error, and to Ruth Margaret Morrow. The first group mentioned also entered into some kind of stipulation with reference to this fact. The matter is in the Supreme Court for
review upon the application of Marjorie Jean, who asserts in effect that
the trial court erred in not adjudging her to be the sole heir of Morrow.
Both the children rely upon the common law marriage of their respective
mothers and deceased as basis of their claim of heirship. It is conceded
that Ruth Margaret is the child of the deceased and Jessie Younker, and
the Supreme Court believes the evidence was amply sufficient to establish
the fact of the common law marriage between the deceased and Jessie
Younker. The case of Marjorie Jean presents an entirely different situation. She was born July 30, 1927. Her mother, in 1908, was married
to one Morse, and in 1923, the mother found employment with the deceased as his stenographer and continued to act for him in that capacity
until some time in 1929. About the year 1924, according to her testimony, she entered into illicit relations with Morrow, which continued
until March 27, 1927. She obtained a final decree of divorce from
Morse on January 19, 1927. She continued to work for deceased until
November 16, 1929, rendering accounts to him for her services in the
name of W. Morse. Cn November 18, 1929, two days after her employment ceased, under the name of Winifred I. Morse, she filed in the
Juvenile Court a petition alleging that Morrow was the father of her
child, Marjorie Jean, and charging him with contributing to the delinquency or dependency of the child in failing to contribute to its support.
On December 2, 1929, this petition was dismissed without prejudice.
On April 24, 1930, under the name of Winifred I. Morse, she filed a
second petition in the Juvenile Court. A trial was had and judgment
entered to the effect that Morrow was not the father of Marjorie Jean.
HELD: 1. The Juvenile Court has jurisdiction to determine parentage. The appointment of a guardian ad litem in a proceeding of this
nature is not required by law, since the child involved is deemed to be a
ward of the state and the Juvenile Court is given all chancery powers to
protect its interest.
2.
Adjudications of personal status are, under proper circumstances, res adjudicata as to such status when it again comes up in question with reference to a different subject matter or in a different cause
of action.
3.
For an alleged illegitimate child to inherit from a deceased
alleged father, she must show that at some time the deceased and her
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mother were lawfully intermarried and that after such marriage she was
recognized by deceased as his child.
4. No common law marriage can arise from the living together
of a man and woman in an intimate relation if during that period one
is married to another.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
INSURANCE-PERMANENT DISABILITY-PAYMENT OF PREMIUMS-

PROOF-Clarke vs. The Equitable Life Assurance Society-No.
13964-Decided May 10, 1937-District Court of DenverHon. James C. Starkweather, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff in error is hereinafter referred to as Clarke and
the defendant in error as the company. Clarke held an insurance policy
in the company which provided that in case of total, permanent disability, she would be paid $50 per month. She was disabled as the result of
an automobile accident. The extent of that disability was not immediately apparent, and she continued to pay premiums. Eventually, she
sued to recover these, and monthly payments from the date of injury.
To her complaint, the company demurred for want of facts. That
demurrer was sustained; she elected to stand; came to the Supreme
Court on error from a judgment of dismissal, and secured a reversal.
Trial to a jury followed. At the close of the evidence the company
moved for a directed verdict giving Clarke one month's benefit with
interest and costs. The motion was sustained and judgment entered
accordingly. To review that judgment a writ was prosecuted. Clarke
was injured June 23, 1930. Aside from her physical injuries the shock
of the accident caused development of a goitre. She returned to work,
inefficiently, but for full compensation, to October 10, then went to a
hospital in November and had the goitre removed. By February 2,
1931, she had fully recovered. She filled out her blanks of proof of
disability January 16, 1931, which reached the company January 2,
and the company admits liability for compensation from that date to
February 2, the date of her recovery. Under the contract, nothing was
due until Clarke became wholly and permanently disabled. Also, total
disability is presumed permanent when it exists for three months; premiums waived are those "falling due after the receipt of such proof."
1. Permanent disability is a fiction elevated to the digHELD:
nity of fact by contract, but not available until so elevated. Clarke
could only recover by proving permanent disability, and this she could
not prove.
2. Clarke was obliged to keep up her payments until she made
proof, or until the stipulated presumption arose.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
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ON THE POLICy-EQUITY-Nicolas vs. Irigoyen-No. 14012-

Decided May 10, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. Frank
McDonough, Sr., Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The contest was between two rival claimants under a
life insurance policy. Bertrand Irigoyen was the insured in a policy
issued by the Capitol Life Insurance Company. He died July 12, 1935.
The policy named his brother, defendant in error, as beneficiary. On
June 13, 1935, the insured signed a notice in due and prescribed form
-received by the company at its home office on July 15--changing the
beneficiary to the plaintiff in error. The original policy accompanied
the substitution notice. These documents were forwarded to the company in compliance with instructions given by the deceased himself at
the time he signed the notice, but the change was not endorsed on the
policy. The policy contained the following provision: "The insured
may from time to time change any designated beneficiary, provided this
policy is not then assigned. Every change must be made by written
notice to the company at its Home Office, accompanied by this policy
for endorsement of the change thereon by the company, and unless so
endorsed, the change shall not take effect. After such endorsement, the
change shall relate back to and take effect as of the date the insured
signed said written notice of change, whether the insured be living at
the time of such endorsement or not." The company, acknowledging
its liability, appealed to equity by inter-pleading both claimants, was
permitted to pay into court the amount due, and to withdraw from the
case. The District Court found in favor of defendant in error. The
judgment is defended in the Supreme Court on two grounds: First, that
because the notice of change of beneficiary was not sent to the company
in the lifetime of the insured, it was ineffectual; and, secondly, that the
attempted substitution was futile because the company did not endorse
the change on the policy.
HELD: 1. The provision of the policy, supra, contemplates the
possibility of the company's not receiving a valid substitution notice
until after an insured has died; therefore, the first contention is overruled.
2. Endorsing the change of beneficiary on the policy is a mere
ministerial duty of the company; there is no discretion to refuse the
endorsements. Equity will consider that to be done which should have
been done, and, therefore, the second contention must be overruled.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Knous not participating.
FRAUD-SALE OF GOODS-CONTRACTS-MATERIAL INDUCEMENTS
-QUESTIONS
OF LAW AND OF FACT-EQUITY-CONSPIRACY,
ACTIONABLE PER SE-INSTRUCTIONS-Morrison vs. Goodspeed

et al.-No. 13891-Decided May 10, 1937-District Court of
Denver-Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The parties appear here as in the District Court and will
be designated.as plaintiff and defendants. Plaintiff, as administratrix of
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the estate of her deceased husband, Clayton R. Morrison, sued the defendants, who were officers and directors of M. E. Traylor and Co., Inc.,
an investment company, for damages for alleged fraud and deceit in the
sale of certain corporate stock to her husband in his lifetime. From a
judgment rendered on a jury verdict adverse to her, she prosecuted error.
Morrison gave the company his order for 600 shares of stock at $19 per
share; acting through some one or more of the defendants as its agent,
it purported to sell to him, and took $10,000 of his money in payment
for such stock. In effect the company gave him a fluctuating I. 0. U.
of a company known to defendants to be insolvent-of which insolvency Morrison was ignorant-the obligation under which rose or fell as
the price of United Aircraft rose above :r fell below the purchased price.
This was the only assurance Morrison had that he ever would get the
stock. Plaintiff charges a conspiracy between all four of the defendants
to defraud Morrison. The company never bought 600 shares of United
Aircraft stock for Morrison and did not own 600 shares or any other
amount of it when it sold him 600 shares and took his $10,000. Subsequent to such sale to him, and up to the date it was adjudicated a
bankrupt, it never procured or owned a share of such stock that it could
have delivered to him, had he paid the balance of the purchase price.
HELD:
1. The facts stated constitute fraud, the constituents of
which consist of the following:
(a)
A false representation of a material existing fact, or a representation as to a material existing fact made with a reckless disregard of
its truth or falsity; or a concealment of a material existing fact, that in
equity and good conscience should be disclosed.
(b)
Knowledge on the part of the one making the representation
that it is false; or utter indifference to its truth or falsity; or knowledge
that he is concealing a material fact that in equity and good conscience
he should disclose.
(c)
Ignorance on the part of the one to whom representations
are made, or from whom such fact is concealed, of the falsity of the representation or of the existence of the fact concealed.
(d)
The representation or concealment made or practiced with
the intention that it shall be acted upon.
(e)
Action on the representation or concealment resulting in
damage.
2.
The common law never forbids any contract to sell merely
because the seller does not own the goods which are the subject of the
bargain, but equity often inquires into the circumstances under which
contracts ordinarily valid were entered into, and if these show fraud
practiced in procuring one to enter into the contract, it does not hesitate
to set it aside or to award damages for the wrong.
3.
The test of material inducement is not whether the plaintiff's
action would, but whether it might have been different if the misrepresentation had not been made.
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4. When reasonable men could draw but one inference from the
facts, materiality is a question of law for the court.
5.
Equity does not permit one man to gamble secretly with
another man's money, no matter how honest his motives or sanguine
his expectations of success.
6.
At common law a conspiracy is defined as a combination between two or more persons to do a criminal or unlawful act or a lawful
act by criminal or unlawful means.
7. In a civil action, conspiracy is not actionable per se. The gist
of such an action is damages, and no right of action accrues until damages
are sustained.
8.
In a civil action, conspiracy need not be shown to have been
entered into for the specific purpose of defrauding the particular person
damaged.
9. An instruction to the effect that insolvency is a fact that may
be considered with all other facts in the case in determining whether
what was done by defendants constituted fraud is not objectionable.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.

FORECLOSURE-CHATTEL

MORTGAGE--SALES--FRAUD--PRACTICE

-Ramstetter et al. us. MacGinnis.-No. 13987-Decided May
10, 1937-DistrictCourt of Jefferson County-Hon. H. E. Munson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Defendant in error was awarded a deficiency judgment
of $2,461.50 in a foreclosure action on a chattel mortgage given by
plaintiffs in error to secure payment of a note for $5,500, given in
payment for 1,350 head of sheep which they purchased from him. The
chattel mortgage contained the provision that if at any time the mortgagee felt himself unsafe and insecure in his security, he could declare the
note due and payable, take possession of the property and sell the same
at such place as he might select. The sheep began to lose weight instead
of gaining weight. Some died of starvation. Defendant in error, with
knowledge of the plaintiffs in error, sold some of the sheep and the proceeds over and above the expense of feeding were credited on the note.
Later, conditions having become worse, the defendant in error foreclosed.
Plaintiffs in error contend fraud in the sale of the sheep and fraud in the
foreclosure, and filed a counterclaim in the sum of $3,000.
1. The purchaser cannot claim to have been deceived
HELD:
and defrauded when he had full opportunity to and did investigate the
property which he was buying without interference on the part of the
other party to the transaction.
2.
The law does not permit one to stand idly by and make no
protest when his property rights are invaded.
3.
The determination of a mortgagee to foreclose because of fear
for the safety of his security "must be reached in good faith," and his
judgment founded on reasonable grounds and probable cause.
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4. The conclusions drawn by the trial court from the evidence
are binding upon the Supreme Court sitting as a reviewing tribunal.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
WATER RIGHTS-DECLARATORY JUDGMENT-CONTRACTS-DEMURRERPAROL EVIDENCE -RECITALS
IN CONTRACTS-How
CONSTRUED--The Las Animas Consolidated Canal Co. vs. Hin-

derlider et al.-No. 14067-Decided May 17, 1937-District
Court of Bent County-A. C. McChesney, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The parties hereinafter referred to as the Las Animas
Company, Hinderlider or the engineer, the Fort Lyon Company, and
the Catlin Consolidated Company as the Catlin Company. In an
amended complaint setting forth the decreed priorities to the use of water
for irrigation of the two companies first named and a certain contract,
signed by the three, and allegations of a violation of its rights thereunder, the Las Animas Company sought a declaratory judgment defining
the rights and status of these parties under said decrees and contract. A
demurrer to the complaint, for defect of parties and want of facts was
filed, and sustained on the second ground. The Las Animas Company
elected to stand and judgment was entered accordingly. To review that
judgment it prosecuted error.
HELD: 1. A written instrument cannot be varied by parol evidence.
2. A contract must be interpreted as a whole; the recitals therein
should be looked to in its construction.
3. A demurrer does not admit conclusions of law.
4. The law makes no distinction between seepage water and other
water in a natural stream.
5.
"While recitals may have a material influence on the construction of the instrument and the determination of the intent of the parties,
they are not strictly any part of the contract. Hence, recitals where
wider than the contractual stipulations cannot extend them."
6. "If one clause is at variance with another, the one contributing
most essentially to the contract will be entitled to more consideration
than that which contributes less, or as has been said, the clause which
essentially requires something to be done to effect the general purpose of
the contract itself is entitled to greater consideration than the other."
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Knous and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
SALES-SUPERSEDEAS-FINDINGS OF A JURY-Knapp vs. Kurd et al.

-No.

14138---Decided May 17, 1937-District Court of Pueblo

County-Hon. John H. Voorhees, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The parties appear herein as in the trial court and will be
designated as plaintiff and defendants. The action was for conversion
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of an automobile for which actual, special and exemplary damages were
prayed. The answer was a general denial of all allegations of the complaint. From a judgment on a verdict for defendants, plaintiff prosecutes this writ of error. The sole question is whether sale of the caralleged to have been converted-by defendants to the plaintiff had been
completed so that plaintiff was the owner at the time the conversion is
alleged to have taken place. The evidence was conflicting and the jury
found that there was no conversion.
HELD: 1. Supersedeas does not lie to a judgment for costs.
2. The Supreme Court is bound by the findings of the jury on
disputed evidence.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Bouck not participating.
AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT--SALES-FRAUD AND DECEIT-NONSUIT--SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE-Haefeli vs. Ahistrand et al.

-No. 13971-Decided May 17, 1937-DistrictCourt of Weld
County-Hon. Claude C. Coffin, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action by plaintiff in error against defendants in error to
recover damages in the sum of $825, and for body judgment. On trial
before a jury, judgment of nonsuit was entered against the plaintiff at
the close of his case, on motion of the defendants. Assignments of error
were based upon the sufficiency of the evidence, and the refusal of the
trial court after the close of the plaintiff's case to permit an amendment
of the plaintiff's complaint to conform to the evidence. It was impossible to determine just what kind of an action the plaintiff sought to
maintain. One Watson listed his 10-acre tract of land for sale with
Ahlstrand for $1,875, subject to an encumbrance of $1,500. It was
one of several pieces of real estate which Ahlstrand had given to Hood
to try and sell. Hood spoke to plaintiff on several occasions about buying it and plaintiff went out and looked at the tract. March 7, 1934,
Ahlstrand, at the request of Hood, secured an option from Watson for
the purchase of the tract for $1,898, subject to the $1,500 encumbrance,
and in favor of "Hood or assigns." On March 12th, Hood sold the
tract to Winograd, and on March 13th, the option was exercised, and
Watson conveyed to Winograd. On March 16th, Hood, believing that
the plaintiff was still interested in buying the tract, made him a proposition for its purchase which was accepted by plaintiff. Plaintiff's contention is that the defendants, cooperating together, conspired to defraud
him by having Hood buy the tract from the original owner at a figure
considerably less than that quoted to plaintiff, and that they used Winograd as a "straw" man, through which they could convey title for the
purpose of the sale to plaintiff. The trial court finally determined that
the action was one in fraud and deceit and dismissed it for failure of
proof.
HELD: 1. The court did not err in refusing to permit the
amendment to the plaintiff's complaint after the close of his case, because
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all of the plaintiff's evidence was in and it was clearly insufficient to support a judgment in any amount for him.
2. Where the evidence is insufficient to establish a cause of action a
judgment of nonsuit is proper.
3. Where a purchaser deals with an agent who he knows is also
representing the seller, it is assumed that he assents thereto, and he is not
entitled to recover any commission or profit which the agent and seller
may have made on the deal.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION -

ELECTION -

TORTS -

DISTINCTION

BETWEEN AN AWARD AND THE VOLUNTARY PAYING OF COMPENSATIONS-ACCEPTANCE OF PAYMENTS AND MEDICAL ATTENTION-King vs. Baur Confectionery Company-No. 14016-

Decided May 17, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. James
C. Starkweather, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: The parties are in the same position as in the court below
and shall be referred to as plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff, while employed by the American District Telegraph Company, in the course of
checking certain apparatus of his employer, on the premises of the defendant, fell into an unguarded ashpit thereon and received critical burns.
The employer reported the accident to the Industrial Commission.
Thereafter, the employer prepared the plaintiff's wage history, which
was presented to the plaintiff for his signature, and signed by him. This
wage history, together with an admission of liability, signed by the
employer and the employer's insurance carrier, were filed with the commission. Pursuant to the admission of liability the insurance carrier paid
to the plaintiff the sum of $12.97 per week, being 50%o of his average
weekly wage. The insurance carrier also paid all medical and hospital
bills contracted in connection with plaintiff's injury. Subsequently, the
plaintiff wrote a letter to the commission, stating that it was his intention to pursue his remedy against the defendant. Commission wrote to
the insurance carrier of plaintiff's intention, and told the carrier that it
was going to close the case. The plaintiff commenced action for damages
in tort against the defendant. On trial of the cause the court directed a
verdict for the defendant upon its motion on the ground that under the
provisions of Sec. 4461, C. L. 1921, any cause of action the plaintiff
might have against the defendant, by operation of law, had been assigned
to the insurance carrier, and thereby the plaintiff had no right to maintain action in his own name and right.
HELD: 1. "Where the act provides that the injured workman
shall elect whether to take under the act or to seek a remedy against a
person not in the employ whose negligence was the cause of the injury
and that such election shall be in advance of suit, the provision for election in advance of suit is for the benefit of the State in the administration
of the accident fund, and not for the benefit of the third person."
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2. Where liability was established by admission, as distinguished
from cases where the liability was imposed by order or award, it is a
"voluntary paying of compensation" rather than an "awarding of compensation."
3. The signing of the wage history form is not an affirmative
pressing of a claim for compensation. It is merely a compliance with
the law.
4. Where no award of compensation has been made, an action
by the injured employee against a third party is not precluded by the
receipt of payments from the employer or the insurance carrier.
5.
The mere acceptance of medical, surgical or hospital aid by the
employee does not constitute an election to take compensation.
6. The fact that there is no evidence of any arrangement equivalent to a final settlement is the determining factor in the allowance and
maintenance of the suit against the third party, defendant.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
INSURANCE LIFTING

Quo WARRANTO
NON-PROFIT CORPORATIONS OF
THE VEIL OF A CORPORATION-DELEGATION

DUTIES-The International Service Union Company vs. State of
Colorado-No. 14119-Decided May 17, 1937-District Court
of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action was brought by the state against the plaintiff
company, a Colorado non-profit corporation. The action is in the nature of quo warranto for the alleged unlawful exercise of powers by the
corporation under its franchise from the state to operate as a corporation
not for pecuniary profit. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff revoking defendant's charter, the defendant prosecuted a writ of error. The
corporation wrote contracts described as "Protection at Net Cost." The
certificate was issued upon payment of $4.00 as membership fee, $1.00
as a registration fee, and $ 1.00 to continue the certificate in effect for the
first thirty days. The application for membership, required before the
issuance of the certificate, contained a proxy to Collison,*one of the incorporators of the company, to vote for the member at all meetings of
the corporation. Among other things, the certificate provided that such
savings, as may be made by actual mortality being less than expected and
by economy of management, would be credited to the beneficiary and a
certificate issued to him showing such credit. Subsequent to the organization of the defendant company, a corporation known as the International Agency Company was formed under the general corporation laws
of the state, Collison being one of the incorporators. Collison acted as
general agent for the defendant corporation, and received a wage based
upon money coming in. Upon the formation of the agency company,
it and the defendant corporation entered into a contract whereby the
agency company was to receive the funds of the corporation as the "agent
and trustee" of the defendant corporation to be used by the agency com-
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pany in the payment of claims. It was stipulated that the corporation
deals with its members on a strictly business basis. The state contends
that the defendant corporation was an insurance company and should
have complied with the insurance laws.
HELD: 1. "Insurance is a contract whereby one party called the
'insurer,' for a consideration, undertakes to pay money or its equivalent,
or to do an act valuable to another party called the 'insured' or to his
'beneficiary,' upon the happening of the hazard or peril insured against,
whereby the party insured or his beneficiary suffers loss or injury."
2. Since the corporation was not formed under the general corporation laws, but under a special act conferring limited powers on
companies organized thereunder, it is necessary to look to the legislative
act under which it was created to ascertain what powers it may exercise.
3.
"The law will, when occasion requires, look behind the names
of societies, and pass its judgment upon their schemes and modes of
business. If the prevalent purpose and nature of an association, of whatever name, be that of insurance, its legal character will not be changed
by the benevolent or charitable results to its beneficiaries. A society
which by contract agrees to pay to the beneficiary of a deceased member
a sum of money, is a mutual insurance company, whatever may be the
terms of payment of the consideration by the member or the mode of
payment of the sum to be paid in the event of his death."
4. Since it is stipulated that there are no social, benevolent, charitable or fraternal features in the organization or operation of the corporation, and since it has no lodge system, it is excluded from the insurance
laws relating to fraternal benefit societies.
5. As to the money returned: whether it be considered a dividend
of the corporation or as a return of an excess assessment, the corporation
is operating contrary to law and contravenes Section 2383, C. L. 1931.
6. The contract with the agency company, whereby it was authorized to perform all work that would otherwise devolve upon the
trustees of the corporation, was an unlawful delegation of powers and
contravenes Section 2382, C. L. 1921.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Hilliard not participating.
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